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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3(2)(d) and (f) 
(1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Was the Judge correct in insisting on going ahead with the trial, even though 
there was substantial evidence that the parties may have had some confusion about the time 
of trial, and whether it was a trial or pretrial conference? 
B. Was the Defendant denied fundamental fairness as required by the Utah and 
U.S. Constitutions? 
C. Did the prosecution present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant 
was indeed guilty of the crime of stalking? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is that, if the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact are erroneous or clearly erroneous, said Findings of Fact should be set aside. U.R.C.P. 
52(a); State v. Pena. 869 P. 2d 932. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
a. The City of Orem alleges that the Defendant committed the of the crime 
of stalking by seeing or attempting to contact the Victim, Charlotte McKinley, after being 
told that she no longer wanted to see him. 
b. The case was unable to be resolved at pretrial, so the matter was set for 
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trial. The Defendant did not appear for the trial, and claims that, because of problems with 
his roommates disposing of his mail, he did not receive notice of the trial date from his 
attorney. 
c. At the trial, the Victim testified that on several occasions the Defendant 
came to her place of work. On many occasions, she had to go to the back of the store and 
have other employees cover while she waited for the Defendant to leave because she did not 
want to see him. She further testified that she and Defendant had never had any kind of 
relationship, and that the Defendant's advances were unwanted. Defendant also contacted 
her in the parking lot when she was getting out of class at school. Because of the repeated 
attempts to contact her, she finally called the police and reported the situation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant failed to appear at the trial; at sentencing, Defendant informed the Court 
that his roommates sometimes threw his mail away rather than give it to him, so he did not 
receive the notice of the trial. Because the Court refused to continue the trial, Defendant was 
denied substantial fairness guaranteed under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. Further, 
Defendant had evidence to present that would have contradicted some of the testimony of the 
victim, but because the Court refused to continue the trial, or to grant a new trial, Defendant 
was able to present his evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF STALKING? 
It is well-established law in Utah as well as other jurisdictions that, in order to convict 
a defendant of a crime, the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
specific elements of the crime of retail theft which must be proven by the prosecution, and 
which are at issue here, are outlined in §76-5-106.5(2), U.C.A. (1953), as amended: 
A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed 
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; 
or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person : 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family 
will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his 
immediate family. 
In the present case, the victim testified that she was very much afraid of Defendant 
and the attention he was giving to her. However, because Defendant did not appear at his 
trial, he was not able to produce the evidence he had that would have shown that the 
relationship between Defendant and the victim was much more extensive than the victim was 
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willing to admit at the trial. Had the Defendant been able to testify at the trial, he could have 
shown that the victim had actually called him on his cell phone, not just once, but many 
times. Because the Defendant was not able to present his evidence, the Court could not 
effectively decide whether the City had proven Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
as is required under the Constitution. 
POINT II 
WAS THE JUDGE CORRECT IN INSISTING ON GOING AHEAD WITH 
THE TRIAL EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT 
THE PARTIES MAY HAVE HAD SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL, AND WHETHER IT WAS A TRIAL OR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE? 
On several occasions, both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have addressed the 
issue of when a trial court should grant a continuance of a trial. In almost every case, both 
courts have held that this decision is within the discretion of the trial court. In State v. 
Featherstone. 781 P. 2d 424, 431, (UT 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "In order to 
constitute reversible error, the error complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that thee 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence." 
More recently, this Court has also addressed this issue. This case involved a 
defendant whose request for a continuance of the trial was denied by the trial court, but later 
reversed by this court. The ruling held in part "Tolano's right to a fair trial outweighed any 
inconvenience to the court, the opposing party, and the jury that may have been caused by 
a continuance." State v. Tolane, 19 P.3d 400,403 (Ut App. 2001). The court continued in 
stating that although inconvenience was one factor to consider in determining whether a 
4 
continuance was warranted, it was only one factor, and would not outweigh the Defendant's 
right to a fair trial. More importantly for the present case, this court went on to state as 
follows: "the final factor-the extent to which Tolano might have suffered harm as a result 
of the court's denial-is the 'most important among the factors."5 Id. At 404. The decision 
also cited State v. Aurellano. 964 P. 2d 1167 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), stating 'Therefore, to 
establish that the prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court 
that there is no reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecution's error, the outcome would 
have been more favorable for defendant." Id. At 1171. 
Applying the standards set by the above two cases, the court should have continued 
the trial when the defendant did not appear, as requested by counsel. Very clearly, Defendant 
was prejudiced by not being able to testify and defend himself at trial. There were very few 
witnesses who would have been inconvenienced by continuing the trial, or granting a new 
trial, and according to the above cases, Defendant's Constitutional right to appear and defend 
himself outweighs any inconvenience incurred by the witnesses or the Court in granting a 
continuance or new trial. 
POINT III 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AS REQUIRED BY 
THE UTAH AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS? 
One of the most basic rights guaranteed under the Constitution is that of fundamental 
fairness. "The essential requirement exacted of the states by the due process clause of the 
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Fourteenth amendment... is that the trial shall be fair." 21 Am. Jur. 2d5 Criminal Law §647. 
Such due process rights require that the Defendant, at a minimum, have an opportunity to 
examine adverse witnesses. Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the 
due process clause unquestionably guarantees to the defendant a right to rebut the case 
proved against him, and this right in turn includes the right ton cross-examine witnesses who 
testify on behalf of the state. U.S. vs. Grande. 620 F. 2d 1026 (CA4,1980). 
In the present case, Defendant did not appear at trial, but was able to explain at his 
sentencing that he believed that his roommates had not given to him the letter notifying him 
of his court date. The right to appear and defend onself against one's accusers is, as noted 
above, a basic, fundamental right. It is of such importance that the trial court should have 
allowed the Defendant to continue the trial, or at the very least, granted a new trial. Failure 
to do either violated Defendant's right to fundamental fairness in the proceedings below. 
SUMMARY 
The City did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of the 
crime of stalking, and the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant to 
Defendant a continuance or a new trial. 
DATED this 7th day of February, 2003. 
kandy M. Tish 
Attorney for Defendant 
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